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either of the original parties.
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I.
A bill of lading is at once a receipt and a contract. As a re-
ceipt it states that certain goods have been received for shipment.
As a contract it contains an agreement for the transportation
and delivery of these goods. It is with the bill of lading as a
receipt that we shall deal in this paper.
Although a bill of lading is a receipt and is, in this respect,
governed very largely by the rules of law applicable to receipts
in general, yet it is far more important than the ordinary re-
ceipt, and deserves a brief preliminary consideration as to its
true legal character. In the first place it is the symbol of the
NoTrz-States that hold carriers liable: New York, Connecticut, Kansas,
Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Alabama. States that hold them not
liable: Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, Missouri, Maryland, Indiana, and
Minnesota.
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property described in it. The law-merchant regards it as a
muniment of title, carrying the property with it, and as a nego-
tiable instrument in itself. But the common law does not go
quite so far. However, at common law it is the representative
of the property to such an extent that a transfer of it transfers
the property. In Evans v. Marlett 1 Chief Justice Holt said,
"The consignee of a bill of lading has such a property that he
may assign it over." Lord Mansfield, who is called "the
founder of the commercial law of England," said,2 "Since the
case in Lord Raymond it has always been held that the delivery
of a bill of lading transferred the property at law." The case of
Lickbarrow v. Mason, 3 decided in 1787, is the leading case on
this question. In it T. & Son had shipped goods to F. and had
sent him an indorsed bill of lading. F. transferred this bill of
lading to Lickbarrow, who made advances on it. Before F. had
either received or paid for the goods he became insolvent. T. &
Son, on learning this, attempted to exercise the right of stop-
page in transitu. They sent a bill of lading which they had
retained, to Mason, who, by the use of it, secured the goods and
sold them for T. & Son. Lickbarrow sued Mason for conversion.
Judge Ashurst, in deciding the case, approved the doctrine as
stated by Chief Justice Holt and Lord Mansfield, and held that
according to the law and "the universal understanding of man-
kind," a transfer of the bill of lading transferred the property.
This being true, Lickbarrow had secured title to the goods
through the bill of lading indorsed by the shipper, and hence he
was allowed to recover.
But the doctrine of Lickbarrow v. Mason goes farther than
simply declaring that "as between the vendor. and third persons
the delivery of a bill of lading is a delivery of the goods them-
selves." It holds that a bill of lading is, to a considerable ex-
tent, a negotiable instrument. Judge Ashurst said, "The
assignee of a bill of lading trusts the indorsement; the instru-
ment is in its nature transferable; in- this respect therefore, it is
similar to the case of a bill of exchange. If the consignor had
intended to restrain the negotiability of it, he should have con-
fined the delivery of the gpods to the vendee only; but he has
made it an indorsable instrument. So it is like a bill of ex-
change; in which case as between the drawer and the payee the
consideration may be gone into, yet it cannot between the drawer
1 Lbrd Raymond 271.
2 Wright v. Campbell, i Fowl. Ex. 388.
3 2 Term Rep. 63.
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and an indorsee; and the reason is because it would enable
either of the original parties to assist in a fraud. The rule is
founded purely on princ6les of law, and not on the custom of
merchants. * * * This is also the case with respect to bills
of lading." This extreme view has not been upheld by the later
decisions. Lord Ellenborough said,4 "A bill of lading indeed
shall pass the property by a bona fide indorsement and delivery,
where it is intended so to operate in the same manner as a direct
delivery of the goods themselves would do, if so intended, but it
cannot o~eratefurther." Lord Campbell said,5 "A bill of lading
is not, like a bill of exchange or a promissory note, a negotiable
instrument which passes by mere delivery to a bona fide trans-
ferree for a valuable consideration without regard to the title of
the parties who make the transfer. * * * If it be stolen
from him or transferred without his authority, a subsequent bona
fide transferree for value cannot make title under it as against
the shipper of the goods." From these and many other cases 6
it is evident that the common law does not regard a bill of lad-
ing as strictly and technically negotiable, like a bill of exchange,
but it does give to the bill of lading a quasi negotiable character.
An assignment of a bill of lading transfers rights in rei, rights to
the specific goods, and these rights are to a certain extent wider
than those possessed by the assignor. An indorser of a bill of
lading does not become liable for the fulfilment of the contract
part of it. 7 An assignment of a bill of exchange, on the con-
trary, merely confers upon the assignee rights in personam. A
bill of lading, transferred without the authority, consent, or
knowledge of the owner, gives no title-not even to a bona fide
holder for value.8 But it has been held that where a bill of
lading was secured by fraud and transferred to an innocent pur-
chaser it gave a good title.9  Hence, it possesses many of the
characteristics of a bill of exchange. By statute in England 10
bills of lading have been made -negotiable by indorsement.
Under this statute the consignee or indorsee to whom the
property has passed by indorsement has all the rights and is
subject to all the liabilities created by the instrument just as if
4 Newson v. Thornton, 6 East. 17.
5 Gurney v. Behrend, 3 El. and B. 622.
6 42 Conn. 579; 9 Fed. Rep. 133; I5 Wend. 474; 44 Md. ii.
7 Maybee v. Tregent, 47 Mich. 595.
8 1o1 U. S. 557, and 34 Ind. r.
9 24 N. Y. 638.
10 18 and ig Vict. c. iii. s. i.
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it had been made to him at first.'1 Several of the United States
have passed similar statutes. Missouri and Pennsylvania made
bills of lading negotiable in the same manner as bills of ex-
change and promissory notes, but the supreme court 
12 held that
these statutes referred only to the manner of transfer and not to
the consequences of such transfer. Maryland has a statute
which makes them negotiable in the same manner and to the
same extent as bills of exchange. In Tiedeman v. Knox 18 it was
held that this statute gave to one who took a bill of lading from
the consignee and applied it to payment of an antecedent debt,
all the rights of a bona fide holder for value and hence the right
to the property described in the bill, although the consignee had
not paid for the goods. The statutes of Mississippi, Minnesota,
Louisiana, New York, California and Wisconsin, are somewhat
to the same effect. But independent of statute many of the
courts of this country hold that, to a very great extent, bills of
lading are negotiable. In actual business they are given a
negotiable character. They pass from hand to hand and are in
constant use as collateral security. Next to commercial paper
they are the most important instruments known to the business
world. While this quasi negotiable character may be destroyed
by a contract expressed upon the face of the instrument, it is
well understood that unless so expressed the carrier is bound to
recognize the validity of transfers and is liable to the holder of a
valid bill for the goods therein described. The fact that every
one who deals with bills of lading is presumed to know their
uses and legal character is an important element in determining
the effects of-bills issued for goods not in fact shipped. This is
the justification for considering their legal character as we have
in this connection.
It often happens either by the mistake, the negligence, or
the fraud of some one concerned, that bills of lading are given
for goods not actually received by the carrier, or for more goods
than in fact come into the carrier's possession. It is our pur-
pose to consider the effect of these false receipts upon the rights
and liabilities of the various parties who may deal with them.
The general rule of law is that rece6ts are onlyprimaface
evidence of the truth of the statements they contain, and hence,
that extrinsic evidence may be introduced to explain or contra-
dict them. Bearing in mind the legal character and the
11 3 L. R . C. P. 594.
12 oi U. S. 557.
18 53 Md. 612 (1880).
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ordinary uses of bills of lading, let us investigate the question,
To what extent does this general rule apply to them as receipts?
This question may arise, first, between the original parties (i. e.,
the one signing the bill and the shipper, or those who take with
notice, or without value); second, between a bona fide holder for
value and either of the original parties; third, between a bona
fide holder for value and the carrier by whose agent the bill of
lading was issued.
First. As between the original and immediate parties to a
bill of lading the general rule applies with full force. The bill
is strong evidence that the goods mentioned therein were de-
livered to the one signing the bill, but it is only evidence and is
open to explanation or contradiction. 14 This rule not only
allows the master or agent who signed the bill to show that the
statements contained in the receipt part of it are false, but it
also allows the ship-owners and carriers the same privilege.
This evidence to explain or contradict is admissible not only
againit the shipper but also against any holder who is not a bona
fide holder for value. Mr. Abbott 15 says, "Except as against a
bona fide transferree of the bill of lading for value, the carrier
may contradict it as to the delivery to him of the goods, or as to
their description, quality, or condition." Judge Edmonds 16 has
said: "As between the shipper of the goods and the owner of the
vessel, a bill of lading may be explained so far as it is a receipt."
Sutton v. Kittell 17 holds that a bill of lading is open to explana-
tion against a consignee unless he has made advances upon it.
In Sears v. Wingate' 8 it is said, "The receipt of a bill of lading
is open to explanation between the master and the shipper."
Judge Shipman in Relyea v. New Haven R. M. Co.,19 held that as
between the ship-owners and the shipper the bill of lading was
open to explanation. It has also been held 2 0 that where a car-
rier has issued a bill of lading for more goods than it received
from the consignor and has paid the consignee the deficiency, it
could recover the amount paid from the consignor. In a recent
case 21 Mr. Justice White held that a railroad company was not
liable to the shipper on a bill of lading given before the goods
14 Redfield on Car. and Bail. p. 218.
15 Trial Evidence, p. 537, § 45.
18 Dickerson v. Seelye, 12 Barb. 102.
17 Sprague's Decisions, 309.
18 3 Allen io3.
19 42 Conn. 579.
20 Graves v. Harwood, 9 Barb. 477.
21 Mo. Pac. R. R. v. McFadden, 154 U. S. 16r.
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were received, although the goods were destroyed by fire at the
place where the carrier was to take possession of them. "The
elementary rule is that the liability of a common carrier de-
pends upon the delivery to him of the goods which he is to
carry." This rule is not changed by the issuance of a bill of
lading, so far as the shipper's rights are concerned.
Second. As between a bona fide holder for value and either
of the original parties, the general rule of law is superseded by
the equitable doctrine of estoppel. When the master of a vessel
or the agent of any common carrier signs a bill of lading for
goods not actually received, or for more than are received, such
master or agent is estopped from denying the truth of the state-
ments made in the bill, as against one who, in good faith, has
relied on those statements and has parted with value. 2 The
shipper who has transferred a bill of lading is also estopped to
deny that he delivered the goods to the carrier as against a bonea
fide transferree for a valuable consideration. Byrne v. Weeks 2 3
held that the master was concluded by statements in his bill of
lading as to the quantity of goods received as against a bone fide
assignee or transferree, and the master was compelled to make
good all loss caused by his misstatements. But if his misstate-
ments are caused by misrepresentations of the shipper, the
master may recover from the shipper all he is compelled to pay
to the assignee.2 4 This principle does not apply to one who
buys the goods before shipment or who does not rely on the bill
of lading.25 Nor is the master concluded by statements of
quantity followed by the qualification "more or less," unless the
deficiency is great.26 In Tindall v. Taylor 2 the consignor after
having sent the bill of lading to the consignee, took the goods
from the master of the vessel. Lord Campbell said, "An
action of contract on the bill of lading could not have been
maintained by the indorsee of the bill of lading; but in respect
to his property in the goods he might have maintained an action
against the master for detaining or converting them, and the
master, after the declaration in the bill of lading on faith of
which the indorsee had bought and paid for them, would be
22 Berkley v. Watling (1837), 7 Ad. and El. 29.
238 7 Bos. 372.
24 Saten v. Standard Oil Co., I7 Hun. 14O.
25 Meyer v. Peck, 28 N. Y. 59o.
26 Kelley v. Bowker, ix Gray 428, and Blanchet v. Powell, etc., Co., L. R. 9
Ex. 74.
27 4 El. and BI. 219.
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estopped from denying that he had received them." Judge
Hoar has said, 28 "The master is estopped, as against a con-
signee who is not a party to the contract and as against an
assignee of the bill of lading, when either has taken it for a
valuable consideration upon the faith of the acknowledgments
which it contains, to deny the truth of the statements to which
he has given credit by his signature, so far as these statements
relate to matters which are or ought to be within his knowl-
edge." Other cases 2 give the consignee a right of action
against the master and estop the master from denying the
statements made in his bills of lading. The same rule is applied
to a warehouseman who has given a false receipt. 30 Hunt v.
Miss. Cent. R. R.,31 holds that an agent of a common carrier would
be liable on a false bill of lading signed byhim, as against a bona
fide holder for value. In England this rule was embodied in the
Bill of Lading Act, 2 in which it is said, "Every bill of lading in
the hands of a consignee or endorsee for a valuable considera-
tion, representing goods to have been shipped on board of a
vessel, shall be conclusive evidence of such shipment as against
the master or oilterperson signing the same." This section of that
act was interpreted in Meyer v. Dresser 3 and Jessel v. Bath.34
In those cases it was held to apply only to the one signing the
bill. It is a well-known application of the doctrine of estoppel
that prevents the consignor who has secured and transferred a
false bill of lading, from denying. the truth of its statements.
This is taken as a settled doctrine in Schooner Freeman v. Buck-
ingham,35 and numerous other cases. So we may conclude that
it is a well-established rule, both in this country and in England
that the immediate parties to a bill of lading (i. e., the consignor
and the one who signs it) are estopped to deny the truth of its
statements as against a bona fide holder for value.
Third. As to the application of the general rule to cases
which arise between a bona fide holder for value and the carrier
whose agent has issued a false bill of lading, there is an inter-
esting conflict of opinion. The courts of England, the Federal
28 Sears v. Wingate, 3 Allen 103.
29 Relyea v. New Haven R. M. Co.. 42 Conn. 579, and Bradstreet v.
Heran, 2 Blatchf. 116.
30 McNeil v. Hill, Woolworth's R. 96.
81 29 La. Ann. 446.
82 iB and i9 Vict. c. iii. s. 3.
83 i6 Com. Bench (N. S.) 644.
34 L. R. 2 Ex. Cases 267.
25 i8 How. 182.
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courts of this country, and several of our State courts hold that
' the general rule applies and that the carrier is not estopped by
the act of its agent, to deny the truth of the bill so far as it
is a receipt. Several other State courts, however, with a con-
siderable show of reason, hold that the carrier is estopped to
deny the statements made by its agent, when the bill comes into
the hands of a bona fide holder for value. Let us consider in
chronological order as nearly as may be convenient: (i) The
English cases; (2) The cases in the United States which adopt
the English doctrine; and (3) The cases which hold the doctrine
of estoppel.
(i) The great case of Lickbarrow v. Mason (1787) did much
to settle the legal character of a bill of lading in England.
From that time until :1851 the conclusiveness of a bill of lading
in the hands of a bona fide holder for value as against the carrier
whose agent signed it, does not seem to have been passed upon
directly. However, in 185I, Grant v. Norway6 decided this
question and established the rule which has been followed by
subsequent decisions. This was an action by the indorsee
against the owner of a vessel to recover the amount advanced on
faith of a bill of lading signed in due form by the master of the
vessel. It was shown to be a custom among merchants to make
advances in that way, but Chief Justice Jervis held that, although
the authority of the master was extensive, yet it had well-known
limitations. He is a general agent to give bills of lading for
goods received. No one could assume that the master had
authority to sign a bill of lading before the goods were put on
board. Hence, in this case he had acted clearly outside his
authority and the owner could not be held liable. Hubbesty v.
Ward3 7 (1853) followed the doctrine of Grant v. Norway. Chief
Baron Pollock said, "We think that when a captain has signed
bills of lading for a cargo that is actually, on board his vessel,
his power is exhausted; he has no right or power, by signing
other bills of lading for goods that are not on board, to charge
his owner." The case of Coleman v. Riches 8 (1855) is in the
same line. R. was a wharfinger and carrier. His agent issued
a false receipt for corn on which C., as wag his custom, made
advances. The court held that the agent was not acting within
the scope of his authority and did not bind his principal. In
36 io Corn. Bench 665.
37 8 Exch. 330.
33 16 Com. Bench 103.
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Meyer v. Dresser 39 (1864) the master of a vessel sued the in-
dorsee of a bill of lading for freight. The indorsee invoked the
statute 40 already referred to and claimed the right to set off for
goods named in the bill of lading but not shipped. It was held
that a cross-action might lie against the master, but that a deduc-
tion could not be allowed from the amount of freight due on other
goods. In Jessel v. Bath 41 (z867) B.'s agent gave a bill of lading
for a certain number of pounds of manganese, when a much
smaller number had been shipped. J., who had paid for the full
amount, relying on the bill of lading, was not allowed to re-
cover, on the ground that the agent exceeded his authority.
McLean v. Fleming2 (1871) was a case against the owner of a
vessel for failing to deliver all the goods called for in the bill of
lading. Held, that the bill of lading was prima fade evidence of
the amount of goods shipped, but that the owners might show
that their agent had given it for more goods than were received.
In Brown v. Powell Coal Co. 43 (1875) the owners of avessel, who
had voluntarily paid a consignee the difference between the
value of the goods delivered and those called for in the bill of
lading, sued the charterer of the vessel to recover this amount.
It was held on the authority of McLean v. Fleming that the
owners were not legally liable to the consignee on the false bill
of lading and hence that they could not recover from the
charterer. In the case of Car v. R. R.44 (1875), Car had bought
goods to be shipped by the railroad and had received from the
railroad advice-notes stating that three parcels had been received
when only two had been in fact received. The servants of the
railroad knew that only two had been received but failed to give
Car notice. Car paid for three and after finding only two, sued
the railroad. judge Brett, in deciding the case, said that the
suit could not be maintained except on the doctrine of estoppel
inpais. He discussed the elements of estoppel and showed that
it could not be applied to the railroad because the railroad did
not know the statements were false and was not negligent.
Lord Esher in Cox v. BruceA5 (1886), held that it was beyond
the agent's authority to bind the owners of a vessel by false
39 16 Com. Bench (N. S.) 646.
40 iB and ig Vict. c. iii. s. 3.
41 L. R. 2 Ex. cases 267.
42 L. R. 2 Scotch Appeals 128.
43 L. R. io C. P. 562.
44 L. R. io Com. Pleas. 307.
45 L. R. i8 Q. B. D. 147.
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statements in regard to the quality or condition of the goods
shipped. The owners were not estopped from proving that the
bill of lading was false in that regard.
These cases show that in England the rule is well established
that a carrier may explain or contradict any bill of lading signed
by its agent without express authority, so far as it is a receipt,
even against a bona fide holder for value.
(2) The Federal courts of this country have adopted the
same rule as that established in England. The first great case
was Schoonei Freeman v. Buckingham 46 (1855). In this case the
general owner of a vessel had made a conditional sale of it and
the special owner by fraud had induced the master to sign a
false bill of lading on which B. had made advances. The court
in deciding that this did not create a lien on the vessel in favor
of B. held that while the vessel was bound to the freight and the
freight to the vessel for the performance of the contract, yet no
lien could arise until a valid contract was made and the cargo
actually shipped. In discussing the doctrine of estoppel in con-
nection with this case Mr. Justice Curtis said, "If the signer of
a bill of lading was not the master of the vessel, no one would
suppose the vessel bound; and the reason is because the bill is
signed by one not in privity with the owner. But the same
reason applies to a signature of a master made out of the course of
his employment. The taker assumes the risk not only of the genuine-
ness of the signatures and of the fact that the signer was master
of the vessel, but also of the apparent authori of the master to
issue the bill of lading. * * * But the master of a vessel has
no more apparent unlimited authority to sign bills of lading than
he has to sign bills of sale of the ship. He has an apparent
authority if the ship be a general one to sign bills of lading for
cargo actually sh#ped and he has also authority to sign. a bill of
sale of the ship, when in case of disaster his power of sale arises.
But the authority in each case arises out of and depends upon a
particular state of facts. It is not an unlimited authority in the
one case more than in the other, and his act in either case does
not bind the owner, even in favor of an innocentpurchaser, if the
facts upon which his power depends did not exist; and it is
incumbent on those who are about to change their, condition,
upon faith of his authority, to ascertain the existence of all the
facts upon which his authority depends." The case of Montell
v. Schooner Rutan47 (1865) was a libel against the vessel and her
46 i8 How. 182.
47 17 Fed. Cases 615.
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master, who was a part owner, by the assignee of a fraudulent
bill of lading issued by the master. Judge Betts said, "A
cardinal restriction which applies to this case is, that a master
cannot subject a ship in ren, much less his co-owners, to a re-
sponsibility for a safe carriage and delivery of a cargo not actualy
laden on board of it for transportation in the lawful employment
of the vessel. This principle is too firmly rooted in the doc-
trines of commercial jurisprudence to be subjected to question
in this country or in England. That, as the libellants prove by
the master himself that he executed the bill of lading with
knowledge that the wheat was not on board at the time, the bill
of lading was nugatory and fraudulent as to the vessel and all her co-
owners, except the master himself." The case of The Lady Franhlin48
(i868), was a libel against the vessel on a bill of lading issued by
mistake for goods which had been shipped by another vessel
and lost. Mr. Justice Davis in deciding that the owners of the
vessel were not estopped to contradict the bill of lading, said,
" There was no cargo to which the ship could be bound and
there was no contract for the performance of which the ship
stood as security." The Loon 49 (1870) was a case almost exactly
like the Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, and Judge Woodruff
arrived at the same decision. Ie held that, although bills of
lading ever since the case of Lickbarrow v. Mason had been
considered negotiable for some purposes, yet they do not import
absolute veriy and are not conclusive on the owners of a vessel
even in the hands of an innocent purchaser. Pollard v. Vinton 50
(i88i) is a great case and passes on the main question directly.
P. accepted and paid a draft relying on the .bill of lading which
the agent of V. 's boat had issued for goods not in fact shipped.
Mr. Justice Miller held that the act of the agent was beyond his
authority and not binding on the owner. In answer to the
argument that the bill of lading was negotiable, he said, "A bill
of lading is an instrument well known in commercial transac-
tions and its character and effect have been defined by judicial
decisions. In the hands of the holder it is evidence of owner-
ship, special or general of the property mentioned in it, and of
the right to receive said property at the place of delivery. Not-
withstanding it is designed to pass from hand to hand, with or
without indorsement, and it is efficacious for its ordinary pur-
poses in the hands of the holder, it is not a negotiable instru-
48 8 Wall. 325.
49 7 Blatchf. 244.
50 105 U. S. 7.
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ment or obligation in the sense that a bill of exchange or
promissory note is. Its transfer does not preclude, as in those
cases, all inquiry into the transaction in which it originated,
because it has come into the hands of a person who has inno-
cently paid value for it. The doctrine of bona fide purchasers
only applies in a limited sense." Robinson v. M. & C. R. R.
Co. 51 (1881) was decided in the same year and on almost the same
facts as Pollard v. Vinton. A bona fide purchaser sued the rail-
road on a bill of lading issued by its agent when no goods were
shipped. In a very learned and exhaustive opinion Judge Ham-
mond attempts to answer all the arguments in favor of the rail-
road's liability. He shows that the bills of lading have been
developed exclusively for the advantage of the trader and not of
the railroad. They are not negotiable securities which the rail-
road is bound to protect. Carriers should not be made insurers
or guarantors on an instrument in which they have no interest.
It is a liability dehors the contract, and the amount of freight paid
does not cover the risk. It would compel the carriers to employ
and pay agents whose qualifications are the same as those of
banks and trust companies. The supposed convenience to com-
merce is not sufficient to overcome these considerations. Be-
sides it would not be difficult for those who deal with bills of
lading to find out concerning their genuineness. Banks and
factors must attend to the honesty of their customers and they
should know that it is the carriers' business to carry and deliver
goods and that its liability does not begin until the goods are
actually received. Carriers were not created for the purpose of
issuing commercial paper. Bills of lading are only quasi nego-
tiable and those who deal with them must ascertain their genu-
ineness. No special or general custom can make them negotia-
ble like bills and notes.52 The doctrine of estoppel is the
strongest argument in favor of the carrier's liability. The
principal is estopped by the representations of his agent so long
as that agent is acting 'zithin the aparent scope of his authoriy. But
carriers do not hold out their agents as having authority to issue
false bills of lading. Such an act is clearly beyond even the
apparent scope of a freight agent's authority. It is doubtful if
the directors themselves could estop the company. The charter
gives no power to issue false bills of lading. The master of a
vessel cannot bind the owners by issuing false bills and he is a
general agent with extensive powers. A freight agent is a spe-
51 9 Fed. R. 129.
52 Whart. Agency, §§ 134, 675, 676.
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cial agent and every one is presumed to know the limitations of
his authority. The whole question rests on the doctrine of
agency and since the agent has acted outside of the scope of his
authority he has failed to bind the carrier. The case of St.
Louis, etc., R. R. v. Knight 53 (x887) was one in which the con-
signee attempted to hold the railroad liable on a bill of lading
because the goods delivered were not of the quality described.
Mr. Justice Matthews held that the agent had no authority to
misdescribe the goods and hence that the railroad was not
estopped to show that the goods delivered to the consignee were
the very goods received for transportation. In Friedlander v.
Texas, etc., R. R.r4 (x889) an assignee for value of a false bill
of lading sued the railroad. . Chief Justice Fuller, in giving the
decision, pointed out the legal character of the instrument and
discussed the doctrine of estoppel as applied to it. He agreed
with the opinion of Mr. Justice Story,5 that a transfer of a
stolen bill of lading would not transfer the title to the goods, but
that if the owner or carrier is negligent, or holds out the agent as
having the necessary authority to issue or transfer the bill of
lading, the doctrine of estoppel would apply. He found that
the railroad had not been negligent and that the agent had de-
parted from his authority and become particep criminis for the
purpose of committing a fraud. He therefore held that the
action could not be maintained against the railroad either on
contract or for tort. Judge Townsend, in Dun v. City Nat. Bk.5
(1893), gives a very learned opinion on this question of agency.
It is a case in which one of Dun's sub-agents had given false
information to the bank concerning the financial standing of an
acceptor of a draft which the bank was about to purchase and
which it did purchase on the faith of this information. The
question raised was, "To what extent is an innocent principal
liable for damages caused by the frauds and deceits of his
agent?" The Judge said the cases on this question were not
harmonious but that the difference was not one of principle but
one of application. Was the agent acting within the scope of
his authority? If so the principal is liable. If not, the principal
is not liable. He found that Dun's agent was not acting within
the scope of his authority when he purposely gave the false
inEormation and hence that Dun was not liable. The case of
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Walters v. W. and A. R. R.57 (1893) seems at first view to be out
of line with the other United States court decisions. A firm was
doing business at A and at M. The railroad officials appointed
one of this firm as agent at M. This agent delivered goods to the
firm without cancelling the bills of lading. Afterwards the firm
sold these bills of lading and the railroad was estopped to deny
their validity. But this case is distinguished from the others in
that the bills were valid when issued and in that the railroad
officials had negligently acquiesced in such irregular dealings
with the firm. So we may say that the decisions in the Federal
courts present a strong and unbroken line to the effect that the
carrier is not estopped to deny the receipt part of a bill of lading
issued by its agent, even as against a bona fide holder for value.
T. H. Cobbs.
(To be continued.)
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